ABSTRACT: William Lane Craig offers two philosophical arguments for the conclusion that the universe began to exist. To be compelling, these arguments must not only be sound-we must also have reasons to be lieve that they are sound. I determine that these arguments do not pro vide such reasons to many individuals. The arguments ultimately rely on supposedly intuitively obvious absurdities. However, if one fails to see these ostensible absurdities-as many philosophers do-then for her, Craig's arguments lack all epistemic force.
The Kalam Cosmological Argument1
1. W hatever begins to exist has a cause. Accordingly, Craig offers four arguments, two scientific and two philosophical, in support of (2). In this article, I will limit my examina tion to the two philosophical arguments-specifically the persuasiveness of these arguments. It seems safe to assume that Craig's presentation of the Kalam is not solely for the purpose of formulating a sound argument; ideally, he w ants to give reasons in support of his argum ent that should be, at the very least, minimally forceful to everyone who understands them.2 Thus, it is both fair and worthwhile to evaluate whether Craig achieves this purpose. Keep in m ind that an effective persuasive argument need not demonstrate the truth of its conclusion beyond all reasonable doubt, but merely show why its premises, and thus its conclusion, are more rea sonable to believe than their denials. Therefore, if Craig's two philosophi cal arguments are to succeed, he m ust provide reasons that philosophi cally obligate all evaluators who understand the reasons to accept them as forceful to at least a minimal degree. I will argue that neither of Craig's two philosophical arguments in support of (2) meets this standard. While
Craig provides reasons that should persuade some individuals, they are not of such strength that they are compelling for all reasonable individuals.
In other words, certain evaluators are rationally justified in denying that Craig's arguments have any epistemic force.
I will begin by examining the argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition. The argum ent is as follows:3_______________________________________________________
2. If all people should find some reason R forceful, then no rational and honest person can properly understand R and proceed to reject R as having no epistemic force. 3. Craig, Kalam, 103. 4. The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition. 5. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
6. Therefore the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.
In order to understand this argum ent one m ust first comprehend the difference between potential and actual infinites. A potential infinite is a collection that increases in num ber indefinitely, always approaching infinity but never reaching it. This can be represented by a curve getting ever closer to an asymptote but never touching it. A potential infinite is in the process of becoming, moving higher and higher on the scale of natural numbers (1, 2, 3, ...), while an actual infinite is a completed totality equal in num ber to the entire set of natural numbers. If one requires a simple way to differentiate the concept of a potential infinity from the concept of an actual infinity, then just remember this: a potential infinity is merely indefinite, whereas an actual infinity is truly infinite. This distinction is im portant because the infinities most often discussed in mathematics are only potential infinities (~) whereas Craig's argument deals w ith actual in finities (a). Note also that there is no highest natural number, for no matter w hat natural num ber (x) you may consider, it is always possible to gener ate a higher num ber (x + 1). Thus, while the set of natural numbers in its entirety is an actual infinite collection, no natural num ber is the immediate predecessor of actual infinity.
Bearing this distinction in mind, I will briefly outline the argument for (5). If you form a collection by adding one member after another, each addition increases the num ber of members in the set by a finite amount. In other words, the num ber of members in the set progresses higher on the scale of natural numbers w ith each addition. Since no natural num ber is the immediate predecessor of actual infinity, a set formed in this m anner can never reach the point w hen the num ber of members in the set is equal to actual infinity. Hence, a collection formed by successive addition, even one progressing indefinitely into the future, w ould merely be a potentially infinite set. The principle that underlies this reasoning is often called the impossibility of traversing the infinite-it is impossible to progress from a finite set to an actually infinite set through successive addition.
This principle is certainly sound, but it is im portant to note that it only applies to finite sets. Thus, if this principle is going to serve as a part of a valid argument in support of (5)-a collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite-then Craig m ust make the additional assum ption that 7. All collections formed by successive addition are finite at some point.
This assum ption seems, at the very least, contestable. It is not immediately apparent why all collections formed by successive addition m ust be finite at one point, and, as far as I can tell, Craig offers no explicit reason to de fend this assumption. We can certainly conceive of a collection formed by successive addition that was at no point finite-consider an actual infinite collection that has always been an actual infinite and is being added to suc cessively.
In fact, Paul Draper points out that if the universe is eternal, then the temporal series of events in time w ould be such a collection. Draper is w orth quoting at length:
If the temporal regress of events is infinite, then the universe has never had a finite number of past events. Rather, it has always been the case that the collection of past events is infinite. Thus, if the temporal regress of events is infinite, then the temporal se ries of events is not an infinite collection formed by successively adding to a finite collection. Rather, it is a collection formed by successively adding to an infinite collection. And surely it is not impossible to form an infinite collection by successively adding to an already infinite collection.4
This objection underm ines support for (5) and consequently, the argument as a whole. D raper's objection does not show that Craig's argu m ent is unsound, but in the absence of some independent reason for (7), it does prevent us from saying that it is more reasonable to accept the argu m ent than to deny it.
Just because Craig does not offer a reason in support of his assum p tion does not m ean that he cannot produce such a reason. So w hat might
Craig say in defense of (7)? At first blush, it seems as if Craig might be tem pted to respond by appealing to the w ord "formed." He might argue that if a set has always existed, then it cannot be formed in any relevant sense. However, this response fails. If any collection that is formed m ust have begun to exist, then proponents of an eternal universe w ould have no reason to accept (4)-the temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition. They w ould simply insist that the temporal series of events is not formed by successive addition. Events are being successively added to the temporal series, but the series itself is not formed. Anyone who did not already believe the universe to have a finite past w ould have no reason to accept (4), underm ining the strength of the argument.
The only other response immediately apparent is to argue that it is impossible for any actually infinite set to exist at all. This, however, argument as sound. On the other hand, if Craig does appeal to the latter philosophical argument to support the former, then these arguments are no longer logically independent as Craig claims that they are.5 In either case, it seems as if whether Craig succeeds in proving that the universe began to exist will be determ ined by the success of his next philosophical argument.
As mentioned previously, this argument is based upon the im pos sibility of an actual infinite set existing in the real world. Craig formulates it as follows:
8. An actual infinite cannot exist.
9. An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
10. Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events can not exist. Craig's favorite thought experiment is that of Hilbert's Hotel. In this experiment, Craig describes a hotel w ith an actual infinite num ber of rooms filled w ith an actual infinite num ber of guests. He then proceeds to demonstrate the absurdities that w ould arise if such a hotel were to exist.
For instance, if all of the guests in the odd num bered rooms leave and all of the remaining guests move to the room num ber that is half of their current room number, then all of the rooms w ould be filled despite the fact that an There are initial reasons to think that this may, in fact, be a relevant difference. Most of the absurdities generated in Hilbert's Hotel are the re sult of inverse operations such as subtraction and division. Craig explains, "In trans-finite arithmetic, inverse operations of subtraction and division are prohibited because they lead to contradictions; but in reality, one can not stop people from checking out of the hotel if they so desire."9 Notice, however, that these trans-finite, inverse operations are only applicable to actual infinites whose members coexist. If the members of an actual infi nite set exist successively, then such operations are impossible, for no one can "take away" events that no longer exist. Thus, we m ight be tem pted to 6 . Ibid., 118-119. 7. Ibid., 121. 8. Ibid., 121. 9. Ibid., 120.
think that the supposed absurdities dem onstrated by Hilbert's Hotel have no bearing on the possibility of an infinite temporal regress.
This line of reasoning, however, is off base. The originator of the Kalam, al-Ghazali, developed an argument to demonstrate that an actual infinite set of events in time entails the possibility of an actual infinite set whose members coexist.10 1 1 Imagine that every day God creates an immor tal hum an being. If the universe has existed for an actual infinite num ber of days, then there w ould also be an actual infinite num ber of hum an be ings coexisting in reality. Therefore, if it is impossible for an actual infinite set to coexist, it is also impossible for an infinite temporal regress to exist.
For the sake of clarity, however, I will introduce an additional thought experiment created by al-Ghazali that works directly w ith sets whose members exist successively. Imagine two planets that have been eternally orbiting the sun. The first planet requires only one year to com plete a full rotation, while the second planet completes a single rotation ev ery thousand years. If these planets have been orbiting from eternity past, then they have both completed an actual infinite num ber of rotations or, in other words, the same num ber of orbits, despite the fact that every thou sand years the first planet completes one thousand times as many rotations as the second planet.11 This, Craig claims, is obviously absurd. Many phi losophers, however, simply do not agree.
In fact, a common rejoinder to such reductios has been to deny the absurdity of their conclusions12 -a strategy Graham Oppy (humorously, I suppose) labels "outsm arting" one's opponent.13 In regards to al-Ghazali's orbiting planet, Oppy is quite content to embrace the ostensibly absurd conclusion. The planets have indeed completed the same num ber of rota- tions, but the set of all rotations completed by the first planet has a cardi nality that is one thousand times greater than the cardinality of the set of all rotations completed by the second planet.14 According to Oppy, there is nothing absurd about this. Craig points out that a strategy of outsm art ing one's opponent can be highly problematic since any position, no matter how obviously absurd, could be defended as long as its proponent is will ing to bite the bullet.15 Therefore, we m ust determine whether the impli cations of al-Ghazali's orbiting planets, as well as other relevant thought experiments, are such intuitively obvious absurdities that those who deny them are either intellectually dishonest or significantly out of touch with reality. 16 To gain a clearer understanding, let us examine exactly how these supposed absurdities are generated. The following discussion involves some basic concepts in set theory including one-to-one correspondence and proper subsets. One-to-one correspondence exists betw een sets A and ii. Euclid's Maxim. The num ber of members in a set is always larger than the num ber of members in any of its proper subsets.
These principles certainly seem obvious, and they are constantly con firmed in our experience. We are not able, however, to endorse both of these principles at the same time w hen dealing w ith actual infinite sets. The num ber of members in each set cannot be both equal and unequal. A contradiction of this nature will be generated anytime that (i), (ii), and (iii) are simultaneously endorsed. Thus, we m ust reject either (i) or (ii) w hen dealing w ith actual infinites.
18. Similar discussions of this triad can be found in Draper, 48, and Morriston, 154.
Craig argues that in the real world, C antor's Principle of Corre spondence and Euclid's Maxim cannot be reasonably rejected. We may be able to conceive of w hat it w ould be like to reject them in m athem ati cal discourse, but w hen it comes to w hat is actually instantiated in reality, these principles cannot be denied. Hence, in order to avoid contradiction we m ust dismiss the possibility of actual infinite sets existing in our world. This is the very point on which many philosophers have challenged Craig.
It is obvious and uncontested that (i) and (ii) hold for finite sets, w ith which we interact continuously in our lives, but why think that it is impossible that one of these principles be denied? What reason can Craig give to con vince us that the Principle of Correspondence and Euclid's Maxim m ust hold for all sets in the real world?
Wes M orriston responds to this point by saying, "Craig's stock an swer is to point once again to the intuitive 'absurdity' of infinite libraries and hotels and the like."19 Ultimately, Craig's claim will rest on intuition.
I, for one, do not find arguing in this fashion to be inherently problematicin fact it seems that virtually all arguments will come to rest on premises we take to be intuitively obvious; however, in such cases the reach of the argument only extends as far as the intuitions supporting it. If Craig's thought experiments do not seem intuitively absurd to an individual, as seems to be the case with many philosophers, then he has not offered any independent reason for why that individual should believe the situation to be absurd. Presumably these absurdities are not so evident that one would have to be intentionally deceitful or significantly out of touch in order to lack the necessary intuitions. It seems reasonable to assume that someone familiar w ith the branch of trans-finite mathematics could view Craig's thought experiments as merely draw ing out intriguing implications of ac tual infinites in the real world. The force of his argum ent ultimately relies on an intuitive appeal. This in itself is innocuous, but it is problematic w hen it becomes clear that many individuals seem to reasonably lack the intuitions to make the appeal ef fective. The argument issues no epistemic obligation to those for which the "absurdities" are not intuitively evident and it appears that the num ber of people to which this applies is significantly higher than Craig w ould like.
In this article I have not tried to evaluate w hether Craig's two phil osophical arguments are sound; rather I have argued that, for many, Craig does not provide strong enough reasons to think that they are sound. In the end, this is not a devastating conclusion for the Kalam. I tend to agree w ith Michael Bergmann in thinking that disagreement between two individu als, even radical disagreement, cannot always be traced back to irrational ity or the use of an impermissible philosophical move.20 It is vain hope to think that there are always going to be reasons that should be forceful for all rational evaluators. Still, anyone who does see the absurdities as intui tively obvious is obligated to affirm Craig's argument as more reasonable to accept than to reject. As for those who do not possess such intuitions, Craig m ust provide some independent reason to support his claim before it will be reasonable for them to accept that the universe began to exist on the basis of these arguments. 
